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Adult Learning and Self Work
Mark Tennant
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to theorize adult education as a vehicle for self change and to
explore how such theorizing has consequences for practice as an adult educator.
Introduction
Adult educators are almost always engaged in pro-
moting learning for personal change. Sometimes
this is made explicit, for example in programs
which aim to improve self-esteem, or self-concept,
or which help people discover their “authentic” self.
Sometimes it is more implicit; for example in pro-
grams which address significant social issues such
as gender stereotyping, racial discrimination, mi-
gration, domestic violence, environmental concerns,
and perhaps health issues: the idea being that indi-
vidual change is inextricably linked to broader so-
cial change. In the workplace, too, most changes
imply a reorientation of individuals’ values or atti-
tudes or the way they see themselves, for example
in learning how to implement a new innovation, or
a new technology, or a new set of procedures in the
workplace, education plays a role in influencing
new worker identities. In all such programs, I argue,
our pedagogical practices contain implicit theoriza-
tions concerning the nature of the self, its develop-
ment or capacity for change, and the way the self
relates to others or to society more generally. By
engaging with theorizations concerning the self, and
self change, practitioners will better be able to ana-
lyze their own assumptions, make explicit their
theoretical position, and tailor their pedagogical
practices accordingly.
The purpose of this paper is to theorize adult
education as a vehicle for self change and to ex-
plore how such theorizing has consequences for
practice as an adult educator. Historically, the most
dominant theorizations have come from develop-
mental psychology. In particular the psychological
literature on adult development has been seen as a
source of understanding the dynamics of change in
adult life, and as such has been screened for its
pedagogical implications. Although this literature is
quite diverse, by and large it has in common the
conventional view that adult education can lead to a
greater awareness of self through cultivating a self
which is independent, rational, autonomous, coher-
ent, and which has a sense of social responsibility.
Such a view of the self has been strongly cha l-
lenged in recent years from a range of different
theoretical positions, largely because it is seen as
overly static and essentialist, and thus ignoring the
socially constructed nature of selfhood. At the very
least the increasing pluralisation of society has
challenged any pretence that universal social and
normative frames of reference can provide un-
changing anchoring points for identity. Indeed, in-
creasing social and cultural mobility has begun to
erode the possibility of developing a self built on
any singular and stable socio-cultural community.
This has meant that the fashioning of “self” has be-
come an individual reflexive enterprise, a lifelong
learning project in which the subject incorporates
experiences and events into an ongoing narrative
about the self. (See Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992;
Gergen, 1996). The argument presented in this pa-
per is that the focus on the self as text or narrative
offers new possibilities for understanding learning
and its relation to self-change. The paper com-
mences with some general observations about the
nature and limitations of dominant psychological
theorizations of the self which have informed adult
education practice. It then traces the various cri-
tiques of such theorizations (e.g., Rose, 1996) and
proposes a narrative approach to understanding.the
self. This is followed by an analysis of the peda-
gogical implications of adopting such a perspective
within a relational view of the self.
Theorizing Self Change
The theoretical models of adult development most
frequently cited in adult education texts are those of
Maslow, Havighurst, Erikson, Levinson, Gould,
Loevinger, and Labouvie-vief. Each of these mod-
els presents a descriptive account of development,
an explanation of the fundamental processes un-
derlying developmental progress, and a clear view
of the end point of development: the mature, fully
developed, psychologically healthy person.
All the above approaches attempt to chart the
life course in terms of a sequence of phases or
stages: periods of stability, equilibrium and balance
alternate, in a largely predictable way, with periods
of instability and transition. Accepting for the mo-
ment that the life course is indeed quite predictable
and stable: what is the source of this predictability
and stability? Is it the result of a natural psycho-
logical unfolding or maturation? Or is it the result
of the living out of a set of largely social expecta-
tions which vary from one society to another and
from one historical period to another? If the latter,
to what extent do social and cultural groupings con-
struct and then prescribe the life course patterns of
their members?  These are the kinds of questions
which were being asked in the mid-1980’s within
the developmental psychology academy at the same
time that Gilligan (1986) was challenging the gen-
der bias in developmental theories (see the pro-
ceedings of a conference on the theme of “social
structure and social construction of life stages,”
published in Human Development, 1986, 29, 145-
180). In many ways the questions are trivial to soci-
ologists, but they are significant because they repre-
sent an attempt to incorporate sociological theory
into an ongoing interest in self-development and
change. The arguments being advanced were es-
sentially threefold: firstly that age-graded norms,
statuses and roles are a feature of social organiza-
tion; secondly, that the state is a key producer of the
institutionalization of the life course; and finally,
that the phenomenon of the “self” as an organized
human subjectivity, is itself a social construction (at
least in part). Now the first two of these arguments
are quite compatible with extant attempts to chart
the life course: all that is needed is a commonsense
recognition that the life course varies historically
and culturally, and a recognition that there exist a
diversity of trajectories which are equally legit i-
mate. But the idea that the concept of “self” is also
socially constructed poses a more fundamental
challenge to the psychology academy. After all, the
“self” is the very subject of psychology, and all the
developmental theories assume a self which, how-
ever connected to society, is ultimately separate
from society. This is an assumption which also per-
vades much therapeutic and educational work:
whether the task is to discover one’s authentic self,
to transcend social constraints, to release one’s in-
ner longings, to unmask the false assumptions of
childhood, or to critically reflect on one’s socio-
cultural assumptions and thereby challenge them.
Further challenges to the privileging of the autono-
mous self in psychology can be found in the writ-
ings of Burman (1994) and Rose (1996).
Theorizations about the self and its capacity for
change are clearly critical to the way we conceive
of therapeutic and educational interventions. It is
clear from the above that a view of the self as
standing separate from the social realm cannot be
sustained. What then are the implications for prac-
tice of a theorization of the self that begins with its
socially constructed nature?  Well this depends on
how one understands “social construction” and the
processes leading to such a construction. One view
of social construction is that exemplified by critical
pedagogy whereby the self participates in its own
subjugation and domination through “false con-
sciousness” produced by membership of a particular
social group, or through the internalization of social
“oppression” via the mechanism of “repression” (in
the psychoanalytic sense). But critical pedagogy
tends to reify the social as a monolithic “other”
which serves to oppress and crush the self. Self
change in critical pedagogy is based on ideology
critique, whereby the aim is to analyze and uncover
of one’s ideological positioning, to understand how
this positioning operates in the interests of oppres-
sion, and through dialogue and action, free oneself
of “false consciousness.”  The problem with this is
that it theorizes a self which is capable of moving
from “false” to “true” consciousness: that is, a ra-
tional and unified self which is capable of freeing
itself from its social situatedness. In this way criti-
cal pedagogy shares common ground with the an-
dragogical and humanistic traditions, traditions
which it opposes for their individualistic approach.
It seems that what is needed is a view of social
construction which avoids the assumption of a uni-
tary, coherent and rational, subject. A way forward
is to replace this view of the individual with the
idea of the subject as a position within a discourse.
In this way the “subject” and the “social” are not
seen as opposed to each other, but as jointly pro-
duced through discursive practices (see Henriques
and others, 1984 for a pioneering and influential
work which introduced this notion to psychology).
What is required then, is a shift in the theories upon
which adult education draws: from theories of the
knowing subject, to theories of discursive practices.
The contemporary debate in this respect is centered
on the role of narrative or discourse in shaping or
positioning the “self.”
The idea of narrative is attractive to therapists
and educators because they are often confronted
with the “stories” of clients and learners and in-
variably need to respond in some way. These stories
emerge from a particular problem or issue but they
are invariably stories about aspects of the self-
perceptions of well being, self satisfaction, self es-
teem, self doubt, efficacy, and so on. One approach
is to accept the story as “given,” that is true for the
person concerned, and to work within the bounda-
ries and parameters of the story as told. But this
limits the capacity of the educator or therapist to
intervene: their role becomes advisory only, there is
no fundamental challenge to the definition of the
problem, and there is little prospect that the prob-
lem will be addressed in all its complexity. An al-
ternative is to challenge the story as told with a
view to exploring different narratives about the self.
It is at this point that two quite different approaches
to the narrative are apparent.
One approach views a narrative construction as a
lens through which the world is seen or as a kind of
internal model which is a guide to identity and ac-
tion. The role of educational and therapeutic inter-
vention is to explore different ways of viewing the
world and different internal models to guide action,
that is, to construct a new “replacement” narrative
which is more functional and adaptive for the per-
son concerned. The resulting re-authoring of the
self has as a normative goal a single, unified and
coherent narrative which resides in the mind of a
single individual.
Gergen and Kaye’s (1992) alternative is to see
the self as relational, as a form of language game. In
the exploration of new ways of relating to others, a
multiplicity of self-accounts is invited, but a com-
mitment to none. In a therapeutic context, such an
approach:   “...encourages the client, on the one
hand, to explore a variety of means of understand-
ing the self, but discourages a commitment to any
of these accounts as standing for the ‘truth of self.’
The narrative constructions thus remain fluid, open
to the shifting tides of circumstance to the forms of
dance that provide fullest sustenance” (p. 255). The
idea of self narration changing according the rela-
tionship in which one is engaged illustrates a shift
in focus from individual selves coming together to
form a relationship, to one where the relationship
takes center stage, with selves being realized only
as a byproduct of relatedness.
The main theoretical tension apparent in the
above approaches to a narrative understanding of
the self is whether the process of self narration
should or could be targeted towards the construc-
tion of a stable, coherent “bounded” identity as a
normative goal; or whether such a project is a chi-
mera, neither desirable nor possible in a world of
multiple and shifting, open-ended and ambiguous
narratives and identities (a relational view of the
self). The remainder of this paper will explore this
tension and how it subtly affects adult education
practice, particularly practice based on critical self-
reflection.
A Narrative Approach to
Adult Education Pedagogy
The narrative approach to understanding develop-
ment and change has much in common with exist-
ing practices in adult education, especially those
associated with reflection on experience. Further-
more there is certainly much common ground in the
idea of the critical subject as one who maintains a
permanent critique of him/herself in the practice
and pursuit of liberty. But how does one’s theoriza-
tion of self-narration have an impact on pedagogical
practices?
First, I would like to explore the implications of
adopting a relational view of the self. It seems that
such a view implies a certain attitude towards what
critical self-reflection may achieve as a pedagogical
tool. It implies for example, that there is no neces-
sity to search for an invariant or definitive story. In-
deed it would be overly rigid and prescriptive to
develop a singular narrative which simply replaces
an earlier, more dysfunctional narrative, because
singular narratives restrain and limit the capacity to
explore different relationships. The emphasis in-
stead is on the indeterminacy of identity, the rela-
tivity of meaning, and the generation and
exploration of a multiplicity of meanings. To return
to Gergen and Kaye (1992), there is a “progression
from learning new meanings, to developing new
categories of meaning, to transforming one’s prem-
ises about the nature of meaning itself” (p. 257).
Under what conditions can such transformations
occur? Anderson and Goolishian (1992) cite the
following conditions:
• where learners have the experience of being
heard
• where learners have their point of view and
feelings understood
• where learners have feel themselves confirmed
and accepted.
This involves a form of interested enquiry on
behalf of the educator, one which opens premises
for exploration. It also implies an openness to dif-
ferent ways of punctuating experience and a readi-
ness to explore multiple perspectives and endorse
their coexistence. Such interventions ostensibly en-
able learners to construct things from different
viewpoints releasing them from the oppression of
limiting narrative beliefs. Learners can be invited
to: “find exceptions to their predominating experi-
ence; to view themselves as prisoners of a culturally
inculcated story they did not create; to imagine how
they might relate their experience to different peo-
ple in their lives; to consider what response they
might invite via their interactional proclivities; to
relate what they imagine to be the experience of
others close to them; to consider how they would
experience their lives if they operated from differ-
ent assumptions-how they might act, what resources
they could call upon in different contexts; what new
solutions might emerge; and to recall precepts once
believed, but now jettisoned” (1992, p. 258).
On first glance this appears to be strikingly
similar to existing theory and practice in adult edu-
cation. Brookfield (1995) for example, regards
critical reflection as “the hunting of assumptions of
power and hegemony. The best way to unearth
these assumptions is to look at what we do from as
many unfamiliar angles as possible” (1995, p. 28).
This appears to be totally compatible with Gergen
and Kaye’s approach to therapy, however when
Brookfield moves on to propose ways of unearthing
assumptions he begins by identifying “four crit i-
cally reflective lenses,” one of which is autobiogra-
phy. But one’s autobiography is not seen as
something which is open to reinterpretation and re-
authoring. Instead it is seen as something which
needs to be “un-earthed” so as to expose its influ-
ence on our beliefs and practices as teachers:
“Analyzing our autobiographies as learners has im-
portant implications for how we teach…the insights
and meanings we draw from these deep experiences
are likely to have a profound and long lasting influ-
ence…we may think we’re teaching according to a
widely accepted curricular or pedagogic model,
only to find, on reflection, that the foundations of
our practice have been laid in our autobiographies
as learners” (1995, p. 31).
Note the emphasis here on autobiography as a
foundation of practice, the uncovering of which
leads to a better understanding and explanation for
our otherwise uncritically accepted beliefs and
commitments regarding teaching and learning. But
this approach assumes a singular biography, which,
however open to denial and distortion in the process
of reflection, is nevertheless available to be “dis-
covered.” The pedagogical emphasis is therefore on
the accurate rendering of one’s autobiography,
which invariably means addressing the distortions
and denials blocking such an accurate rendition.
The emphasis at the outset then is on discovery
rather than creation: the questions posed are  “Who
am I?” and “Have I got it right?” and “What is the
secret of my desire?” rather than “Is this rendering
of experience/autobiography desirable?” and “What
relationships can be invented or modulated through
such a rendering of experience? It is the latter ques-
tions which are posed when adopting a relational
view of the self. Although some of the teaching
techniques may be similar on the surface (for ex-
ample exploring alternative interpretations with
other teachers/learners), the whole project is fun-
damentally different. For example, in exploring
one’s positionality as a teacher, the task is not to
“discover” and problematise “who we are” or “how
we are positioned” in terms of race, gender, class,
sexual orientation, or ableness; but to explore mul-
tiple stories around each of these categories with a
view to opening up new relations of power and
authority (see Tisdell, 1998, for a slightly different
treatment of positionality in post-structuralist femi-
nist pedagogy).
Thus from a relational view the pedagogy of self
reflection insists, not on discovering who one is, but
on creating who one might become. But some crit-
ics have claimed that an extreme relational point of
view rejects any standards by which to judge or
evaluate what we are to become, and rejects the
pursuit of any stable or coherent identity as being a
normative goal.
But it is clearly possible to maintain a relational
point of view so long as one’s standards and
evaluative criteria are problematised and open to
reinscription. Similarly with the question of the pur-
suit of a coherent, continuous self as a normative
goal. Now in many adult education sites this is seen
as indispensable to transformative (and thereby re-
sistant) adult education practice. For example,
courses designed to provide opportunities to explore
indigenous “ways of knowing” are often based on
the working assumption that there is a culture to be
“discovered.” Participants, in discovering their
cultural heritage, are provided with a new anchoring
point for their identity, an identity which had hith-
erto being fragmented by colonization. Now it is
true that a relational point of view would avoid no-
tions like “discovery” and it would reject the idea of
a unitary, fixed, and coherent cultural identity. But
it does not reject indigenous culture as meaningless,
it simply insists that there is space for re-
inscription; for the telling of new stories that have
not yet been told – stories which are partial, hybrid
and fragile (see Taylor, 1995). It is this opening up
of possibilities which is the distinguishing feature
of a pedagogy built on a relational view of the self.
Concluding Remarks
A conventional view of adult education as cultivat-
ing a self which is independent, rational, autono-
mous, and coherent, is no longer sustainable in a
world characterized by difference and diversity.
The problem with such a conventional view is that
it is incompatible with inclusive educational prac-
tice. The need to take into account a plurality of
perspectives demands a pedagogy which invites a
multiplicity of self-accounts. A narrative approach
which incorporates a relational view of the self, I
argued, achieves this aim. It constitutes a funda-
mental shift in how learning for self-change is con-
ceived and realized in the formulation of goals and
purposes, and in everyday engagement with learn-
ers.
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